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Although there have been many studies of the different ways
regimes censor the use of social media by their citizens, shut-
ting off social media altogether is something that rarely happens.
However, it happens at the most politically sensitive times and
has widespread—if not global—consequences for political, eco-
nomic and cultural life. When do states disconnect their digital
networks, and why? To answer this question, the authors build an
event history database of incidents in which a regime went beyond
mere censorship of particular websites or users. The authors draw
from multiple sources, including major news media, specialized
news services, and international experts, to construct an event log
database of 566 incidents. This rich, original dataset allows for
a nuanced analysis of the conditions for state action, and the
authors offer some assessment of the effect of such desperate action.
Comparative analysis indicates that both democratic and author-
itarian regimes disable social media networks for citing concerns
about national security, protecting authority figures, and preserv-
ing cultural and religious morals. Whereas democracies disable
social media with the goal of protecting children, authoritarian
regimes also attempt to eliminate what they perceive as propa-
ganda on social media. The authors cover the period 1995–2011
and build a grounded typology on the basis of regime type, what
states actually did to interfere with digital networks, why they did
it, and who was affected.
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Between January and April 2011, public demand for political reform
cascaded from Tunis to Cairo, Sana’a, Amman, and Manama. This inspired
people in Casablanca, Damascus, Tripoli, and dozens of other secondary
cities to take to the streets to demand change. By May, the political casu-
alties were significant: Tunisia’s Ben Ali and Egypt’s Mubarak, two of the
region’s most recalcitrant dictators, were gone; Libya was locked in a civil
war; several monarchs had sacked their cabinets and committed to consti-
tutional reforms (and some several times over). Governments around the
region had sued for peace by promising their citizens hundreds of billions
of dollars in new spending measures for infrastructure projects, family and
unemployment benefits, free or subsidized food, salary increases for civil
servants and military personnel, tax cuts, affordable-housing subsidies, and
social security programs. Morocco and Saudi Arabia appeared to fend off
serious domestic uprisings, but the outcomes for regimes in Bahrain, Jordan,
Syria, and Yemen were far from certain. Democratization movements had
existed long before technologies such as mobile phones and the Internet
came to these countries. With these technologies, people sharing an interest
in democracy built extensive networks, created social capital, and organized
political action. With these technologies, virtual networks materialized in the
streets. As a desperate measure, many states tried to choke off information
flows between activists, and between activists and the rest of the world.
Mubarak tried to disconnect his citizens from the global information
infrastructure in the last week of January 2011. It was a desperate maneuver
with mixed effect. A small group of tech-savvy students and civil society
leaders had organized satellite phone and dialup connections to Israel and
Europe, so they were able to keep up strong links to the rest of the world. It
appears that some of the telecommunications engineers acted slowly on the
order to choke off Internet access. The first large Internet service provider
(ISP) was asked to shut down on Friday, January 28, but engineers did not
make the change until Saturday. Other providers responded quickly, but
returned to normal service on Monday. The amount of bandwidth going
into Egypt certainly dropped off for 4 days, but it was not the informa-
tion blackout Mubarak had asked for. Taking down the nation’s information
infrastructure also crippled government agencies. The people most affected
were middle-class Egyptians, who were cut off from Internet service at
home. Some people certainly stayed there, isolated and uncertain about
the status of their friends and family. In the absence of information about
the crisis, others took to the streets, eager to find out what was going on.
This was not the first wave of incidents in which governments discon-
nected their citizens from global information flows. On Friday, June 12, 2009,
Iran voted. When voters realized the election had been rigged, many took
to the streets to protest. Social media such as Twitter, Facebook, and SMS
messaging were actively used to coordinate the movements of protesters
and to get images and news out to the international community. Compared
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with protests that occurred the last time elections were stolen, the social
movement lasted longer, it drew in millions more participants, and there
were more witnesses to the brutal regime crackdown. Social media had a
clear role in extending the life of civil disobedience. Although the theo-
cratic regime did not fall, there were some important outcomes: the ruling
mullahs were split in opinion about the severity of the crackdown. As part
of the response, the regime attempted to disable national mobile phone
networks. It disconnected the national Internet information infrastructure for
several hours and installed a deep-packet inspection system that significantly
slowed traffic.
For civil society actors around the world, digital media and online social
networking applications have changed the way in which dissent is orga-
nized (Bimber, 2005; Howard, 2010; Still, 2005). Social movement leaders
from around the world use online applications and digital content systems
to organize collective action, activate local protest networks, network with
international social movements, and share their political perspective with
global media systems (Byrne, 2007; De Kloet, 2002; Shumate, 2006). In the
past, authoritarian regimes easily controlled broadcast media in times of
political crisis; by destroying newsprint supplies, seizing radio and television
stations, and blocking phone calls. It is certainly more difficult to control dig-
ital media on a regular basis, but there have been occasions in which states
have disabled a range of marginal to significant portions of their national
information infrastructure. What situational tendencies cause state-powers
to exercise specific acts of blocking Internet access and disabling digital net-
works? When do regimes resort to the more extreme measures of shutting
off Internet access? When they do not have the capacity to control digital
networks, how do states respond offline to dissent and criticism? What is the
effect of doing so, and who is most affected?
It is difficult to investigate patterns of state censorship. Many reports
of censorship are essentially self-reports by technology users who assume
there is a political reason behind their inability to connect to a digital net-
work, whether they are mobile phone networks, gaming networks, or the
Internet. Sometimes the state admits to acts of censorship, which makes it
easier to learn why the government interfered and to what effect. Other
times the state acts so clumsily or breaks the communication link between
such large networks that many users can report being affected. While sev-
eral researchers study the broad social effect of censorship, there are only
a few who are able to provide evidence about both the shared perception
that the state is surveilling its public and specific incidents of censorship that
involve disconnections in digital networks (Deibert, Palfrey, Rohozinski, &
Zittrain, 2010; Deibert, Palfrey, Rohozinski, Zittrain, & Stein, 2008). Drawing
from multiple sources, however, it is possible to do a comparative analy-
sis of the myriad incidents in which government officials decide to censor
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their online publics. By collecting as many known incidents of state inter-
vention in information networks, it is possible to map out the contours of
crisis situations, political risks, and civic innovations to understand the new
intersections between state power and civil society.
Not all incidents involve authoritarian regimes, and not all acts of
state censorship are easy to describe and classify. One of the first inci-
dents occurred on December 29, 1995, when German prosecutors demanded
that an ISP block 4 million worldwide subscribers from reading sex-related
information on portions of the Internet. This was the first instance of such
drastic measures of state censorship, legislation, and regulation of infor-
mation received online. Motivation for the shutdown came from a police
investigation into child pornography in Bavaria, Germany. Although German
officials were targeting 220,000 German subscribers when they asked for the
block, CompuServe had no mechanism in place to limit just German users at
the time, thus, they shut down service to all subscribers. In all, CompuServe
restricted subscriber access to 200 newsgroups, specifically related to the site
Usenet. Reaction to the censorship elicited varied responses from community
and civic groups. The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, for
example, hailed it as a form of “electronic citizenship.” Meanwhile, groups
such as the Electronic Freedom Foundation indicated both concern and
resistance to the notion of state control over individual rights online.
This early incident of state intervention with Internet connectivity
brought forth questions that we still struggle to answer today: Who controls
Internet content? What are the legitimate reasons for state interference with
digital networks? Over the past 15 years, we find that states are increasingly
willing to interfere with the links between nodes of digital infrastructure by
shutting out particular users or shutting off particular servers, by breaking the
links to subnetworks of digital media, and sometimes even by disconnecting
national information infrastructure from global networks.
Recently, Research in Motion (RIM) was involved in a complex issue
involving several states’ requests to provide better access to the server
nodes in Blackberry service networks. In the spring of 2010, a prominent
political figure in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) used his Blackberry’s
mobile camera to record himself torturing a Bangladeshi migrant worker.
The video was taken and posted online, causing outrage from human rights
groups and embarrassing the country’s ruling elites. The UAE’s response has
been to demand that RIM provide dedicated servers within their territory
so that the regime could monitor traffic and disable services as needed.
Eventually both Saudi Arabia and the UAE threatened to ban the use of the
popular Blackberry smart phone. The UAE threatened to block access to
text messages, e-mail, and web browsers if RIM did not allow government
access for security investigations. The threat of censorship was still in place
as of October 2010, potentially affecting more than half a million users of
the most popular smart phone in the UAE.
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In 2010, India followed suit, also citing national security as the impetus
for demanding RIM stop encrypting data sent through their phones. This inci-
dent illustrates a growing tension between governments and mobile Internet
users’ privacy today. Increasingly, over the past decade private companies
and ISP providers like RIM are caught in between meeting the security and
information needs of their citizen users, and obeying imposed government
regulations by nation states. Most recently, Vodafone was under pressure
from both Mubarak’s regime to shut off Internet access and civil society
activists to keep the communication channels open. Concession by the ISPs
is more valuable to these states than a block however, as a block will
severely limit businesses run by citizens in these countries as well as those
of visitors and tourists. After Vodafone complied with Mubarak’s regime to
turn off Internet access, it cost the national economy an estimated $90 mil-
lion and the country’s reputation as a safe and stable place for technology
firms to invest.
Since 1995—the year the National Science Foundation effectively pri-
vatized the Internet—there have been at least 566 occasions in which
governments intervened in the connections of a digital network. Of these,
about half were enacted by authoritarian regimes. The three countries with
the highest number of incidents, China, Tunisia, and Turkey, represent both
authoritarian and democratic regimes. In times of political uncertainty, rigged
elections, or military incursions, ruling elites are sometimes willing to inter-
fere with information infrastructure as a way of managing crises. In many of
these cases, the targets (victims) are active domestic civic society movements
with international linkages. When these movements organize, authoritar-
ian governments can react harshly and invasively by blocking access to
the global Internet. Yet at the same time, these authoritarian regimes find
that they cannot block Internet access for extended periods, both because
doing so has an effect on the national economy and because of interna-
tional political pressure. Shutting off the Internet for a country’s network
also has an effect on the capacity of the state to respond to the crisis—for
example, Egyptian authorities did not expect that turning off Internet and
SMS networks would draw out protesters in larger numbers to the street.
Therefore, the decision tree for choking off Internet access also involves
some willingness to incapacitate portions of the government’s security appa-
ratus. Increasingly, civil society groups find methods to circumvent the
blocked social media. A significant corpus of literature has grown around
the use of newer digital media by social movements against authoritarian
regimes (Garrett, 2006; Marmura, 2008; McLaughlin, 2003). Although there
is a healthy ongoing conversation by scholars on the issue of civil societies’
uses of digital media for social and political mobilization, this investigation
illuminates the impetuses, tactics, and effects of state responses to online
engagement.
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We conduct a comparative case analysis of the occasions in which
regimes disconnected significant portions of their national digital infrastruc-
ture, including mobile phones and Internet access. Our goal is to define the
range of situations in which states have actually disrupted large sections of
their own national information infrastructure. Through a grounded compar-
ison of incidence, we demonstrate the importance of understanding how
information technologies have a role in political responses and counterin-
surgency tactics of many kinds of regimes. Such comparative study will help
explicate the meaning of contemporary state power in media systems of
both advanced and developing countries. Although some have argued that
the state no longer has strong control of media production and consump-
tion systems, there are a range of occasions in which state power over digital
networks is noticeably strong.
METHODS AND DATA
Event history analysis is a commonly used comparative method for under-
standing the real circumstances of political crises. More important, it is
particularly useful for developing nuanced understanding of relatively new
social phenomena, and for building typologies and categories of politi-
cal action. Drawing on a range of sources, we built a unique collection
of detailed event logs for major disruptions in digital networks of nations
between 1995 and 2010. We collected information about incidents as
reported in major news media, specialized news sources such as national
security and information security blogs, and other online forums for dis-
cussing such topics. These sources include Google News, LexisNexis,
Attrition.org, GlobalVoices.org, among others.
A case is defined as an occasion in which a government intervened in a
digital network by breaking or turning off connections between national sub-
networks and global information networks. Sometimes this meant blocking
ports or access to a particular subnetwork of digital media, such as con-
tent at the domains Facebook.com or YouTube.com. In times of significant
political or military crisis, such as war or contested elections, the govern-
ments might disconnect SMS messaging services or block the entire country’s
access to global networks. In addition, regimes may target individual actors
in networks. However, these incidents are more than general government
threats of surveillance or intimidation (which are also forms of censorship).
These are distinct incidents where government officials made the specific
decision to disable the links or nodes in the portions of the information
networks they can control.
Because the literature on digital censorship often makes a distinction
between democracies, emerging democracies and authoritarian regimes, we
rely on the Polity IV data about regime type (Marshall & Jaggers, 2010). In
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addition, since several of the governments appearing in the event log are
too fragile to sensibly be given one of these three categories, we rely on
Polity IV data for a category of fragile regimes. As per Polity IV coding, if a
state was recovering from civil war or foreign military invasion, experiencing
a complex humanitarian disaster, or had effectively failed for other reasons,
we code this state as fragile. A state’s regime type was set according to the
Polity IV score for that state in the year of the reported incident. Several
countries had several incidents, and it is possible that regime types changed
over time.
All in all, there were 566 unique incidents involving 101 countries: 39%
of the incidents occurred in democracies, 7% occurred in emerging democ-
racies, 51% occurred in authoritarian regimes, and 2% occurred in fragile
states. Each incident was coded for the name of the country in which a state
agency intervened in digital networks, the year of the incident, the type of
regime, and a precise date if available. We made general notes on the narra-
tive of each incident, and mapped on the Polity IV score for the country in
the year of the incident. Then we developed three standardized typologies
for the kinds of incidents being reported. First, we developed a category
that iteratively helped define the case, and a typology of actions that states
take against social media. Second, we developed a category for why they
took that action, sometimes relying on third-party reports if the state simply
denied any interference. Last, we developed a category for the effect of the
interference.
Although we might expect authoritarian regimes to more aggressively
interfere with their digital infrastructure than other types of regimes, Figure 1
reveals that democracies also substantively disconnect their communication
networks. In recent years, there have been at least 80 incidents a year. Only
a fraction of these involve emerging democracies, but Figure 1 only begins
the analysis. Over time, it appears that all types of regimes have become
more and more willing to interfere with information access. As social media
have diffused, they have become a fundamental infrastructure for collective
action. Even though democracies appear just as aggressive as authoritarian
regimes in disconnecting digital networks, are there differences in the ways
in which such states intervene? What are the different reasons for such drastic
interventions?
ANALYSIS: DECISION PATHS AND OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURES
Civil society is often defined as the self-generating and self-supporting com-
munity of people who share a normative order and volunteer to organize
political, economic or cultural activities that are independent from the state
(Diamond, 1994). Civil society groups are a crucial part of all elections
because they represent diverse perspectives and promote those perspectives
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FIGURE 1 Number of Major Incidents of State Intervention in Digital Networks, By Regime
Type, 1995–2011 (N = 566). Current as of April 2011. Regime Type Attributed to the Specific
Year in Which Incident Was Recorded.
through communications media. Moreover, a key tenet of the shared norma-
tive order is that no one group can claim to represent the whole of society.
Democracy is best served by a multitude of groups that contribute in dif-
ferent ways to conceiving public policy options and national development
goals. Some governments work hard to censor digital media, but even in
such countries the Internet is difficult to control. Governments might own
nodes in the network, but rarely can they completely choke off network
connections. This means that tools like YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, and
e-mail are useful, and at sensitive times, critical, organizational tools. In
some of the toughest authoritarian regimes, these tools are crucial because
face-to-face conversations about political life are so problematic. For civil
society groups—these tools are often content distribution systems largely
independent of the state.
The Internet has become an invaluable logistical tool for organization
and communication for civil society groups. It is an information infrastruc-
ture mostly independent of the state, and since civil society groups are by
definition social organizations independent of the state, the Internet has
become an important incubator for social movements (radical and secu-
lar) and civic action. The Internet has altered the dynamics of political
communication systems in many countries, such that the Internet itself is
the site of political contestation between the state and civil society.
How Do States Interfere With Digital Networks?
We find that states interfere with digital networks using many tactics,
with various levels of severity: online, by shutting down political web-
sites or portals; offline, by arresting journalists, bloggers, activists, and
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TABLE 1 How Do States Disconnect Their Digital Networks? Incidents, by Regime Type
(N = 754)
Emerging
Democracy democracy Authoritarian Fragile Total
Complete network shutdown
(full networks)
13 3 30 3 49
Specific site-oriented
shutdowns (subnetworks)
140 25 210 8 383
Individual users (Nodes) 82 16 125 3 226
By proxy through Internet
service provider
47 4 41 4 96
Note. Incident types are not mutually exclusive, given that some incidents involved combinations of state
tactics against social media use.
citizens; by proxy, through controlling ISPs, forcing companies to shut down
specific websites or denying access to disagreeable content; and, in the
most extreme cases, shutting down access to entire online and mobile
networks. Surprisingly, we find that while authoritarian regimes practice
controlling full-networks, subnetworks, and nodes more than democracies,
democracies are the most likely to target civil society actors by proxy by
manipulating ISPs. Table 1 presents cases where governments exercised con-
trol by targeting full-networks (shutting down the Internet), subnetworks
(blocking websites), network-nodes (targeting individuals), and by proxy
(pressuring ISPs).
The most extreme form of network control is when states shut down
access to the Internet. Authoritarian regimes did so significantly more than
fragile states and emerging democracies, and also twice as more as democra-
cies. A clear illustration of this was when China shut down Internet services
in the Xinjiang region after ethnic riots erupted in 2006. The riots resulted
in 140 fatalities, and the state has since blocked access to Twitter and other
social networking sites to control the conflict and dissent. More recently,
Pakistan severely restricted the Internet after a US-based cartoonist organized
an “Everybody Draw Mohammed Day.” After the event attracted 43,000
fans from around the world, the Pakistan government went into ‘banning
mode’ because the event invited members to draw and post pictures of the
revered prophet. Similarly, emerging democracies, like Haiti and Thailand,
have engaged in shutting down main ISPs, or entire online networks like
YouTube, respectively. Thousands of Haitians lost Internet access in 1999
when the government attempted to allegedly silence dissent and consolidate
power under the guise of punishing Alpha Network Communications for
selling telephone cards and providing international telephone services. More
recently, Bangladesh blocked YouTube and most other file sharing ser-
vices after recordings of a meeting between the Prime Minister and army
senior officers were leaked onto YouTube. Thailand, also an emerging
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democracy with a record of political online censorship, maintains a block
on entire Internet services such as YouTube. Bangladesh, a democracy,
also blocked entire networks when a political crisis over the murder of a
prominent lawyer raged on the WordPress network. These examples sug-
gest that although complete network shut-downs are least common, they
tend to materialize when states face national controversies and moments of
severe social and political unrest, often (but by no means exclusively) in
authoritarian regimes.
Unlike the most extreme measure of shutting down entire online net-
works, states are most likely to target individual websites (online) or their
producers and users (offline). Democracies are much more likely to engage
in online content censorship than other tactics, although they also frequently
target civil society members offline. The earliest case of a democracy shutting
down online subnetworks was in 1995 when German authorities removed
access to over 200 Internet newsgroups deemed indecent and offensive. In
1996, German authorities again removed access to banned material, such as
a Netherland’s online magazine. More recently, advanced democracies such
as Australia, as of July 2010, is considering a mandatory Internet filter to
censor a list of URLs associated with child sexual abuse, bestiality, sexual
violence, crime, violence, drug use, and content advocating violence and
extremism.
While socially questionable material and content promoting criminal
activities are commonly cited reasons for blocking content in democratic
states, some states have also used this as a tactic for foreign policy disputes.
In August 2010, South Korea engaged in an online dispute with North Korea
over social media when South Korean citizens were threatened with arrests
for accessing North Korea’s Twitter feed. However, despite attempting to
reroute requests from North Korea’s Twitter page to a warning page, more
than 9,000 followers had accumulated.
In instances such as this, when unable to block online content
effectively, states are forced to go directly towards censoring individuals.
Authoritarian states do this most often, and in many cases, with more sever-
ity. Bloggers, journalists, and social activists are the most common individual
targets of offline censorship, often facing arrests and fines. For example,
an Egyptian blogger was sentenced to 4 years in prison for insulting the
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Following Thailand’s coup d’état in 2006,
two cyber dissidents were arrested for comments made about the monar-
chy in online discussion boards, and now face a minimum sentence of 15
years in prison. Another example of online activities leading to offline gov-
ernment reactions is Cuba’s arrests of two online journalists working for
CubaNet in 2005 and 2007. These journalists were arrested for engaging
in “subversive propaganda” and “precriminal social danger.” With authori-
tarian regimes, it is generally the case that criticisms of political elites are
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often dealt with the imposition of fines, searches, seizure of equipment, and
imprisonment.
Although democracies also engage in a good amount of censoring indi-
vidual users, paralleling the conditions of authoritarian regimes, they also
have a unique tendency to target individuals providing the infrastructure.
Democracies have a slightly higher rate of blocking content and control-
ling civil society actors through indirect measures, such as targeting Internet
ISPs. Turkey and Italy, both democracies, have legally pursued charges
against ISPs and their users. In March 2010, an Italian court convicted three
Google executives for not removing violent video content that appeared
on their online services. In August 2009, Malawi approved legal mea-
sures to pressure ISPs in monitoring social networking sites such as Twitter
and Facebook. Hungary and Belgium have also shared experiences where
ISPs have received pressures to approve “notices of takedown” procedures
from their governments. It is surprising to note that although authoritarian
regimes frequently fine and imprison civil society actors directly for criticiz-
ing the regime and its elites, democracies have more examples of regimes
using legal frameworks and roundabout measures for targeting ISPs and
their users.
Why Do States Interfere With Digital Networks?
Looking across all of the incidents, we identified twelve categories repre-
sented two broader themes—protecting political authority and preserving
the public good. The first broad theme of protecting leadership and state
institutions included several kinds of reasons for state interference in public
access to social media. These reasons include: protecting political leaders
and state institutions; election crisis; eliminating propaganda; mitigating dis-
sidence; and national security. National security was the most commonly
cited reason under this theme, where officials cited “terrorism threats”
and preventing the spread of “state secrets” as reasons to intervene with
Internet access. Information that undermined protection of authority fig-
ures in any way was another subcategory oft attributed for intervention.
For example, in 2007 Kazakh officials shut down opposition websites for
3 days, because of published transcripts and recordings related to a public
battle between authoritarian President Nazarbayev and his estranged son-
in-law. The eliminating propaganda subcategory included incidents where
intervention occurred because of the spread of information aimed at serv-
ing an agenda undermining the standing regime. For example, China in
2003 sentenced an individual to 4 years in prison for e-mail discussions and
postings in online forums and chat rooms related to democracy. The mit-
igating dissidence subcategory captures those cases in which intervention
was attributed to an attempt to reduce dissident civic action, such as the
U.S. arresting two individuals who tweeted about police locations during
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G20 protests in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania in 2009. Incidents included under
the election crisis subcategory include cases in which a regime acted in
response to events surrounding elections. This subcategory included times
when the regime intervened prior to, during, or after elections. For example,
in the aftermath of the highly contested Iranian elections in 2009, the regime
first slowed and then shut down access to the Twitter network, which was
heavily used by protestors to coordinate and share information about the
contested elections.
The second over-arching theme for why states disabled social media
was in claiming an urgent need to preserve the public good. Sub-categories
of this theme include: preserving cultural and religious morals; preserv-
ing racial harmony; protecting children; cultural preservation; protecting
individuals’ privacy; and dissuading criminal activity. Preserving cultural
and religious morals was the most cited reason for intervention across all
themes and categories. This subcategory was used in incidents when officials
attributed intervention to preventing the spread of blasphemous or offen-
sive information that challenged the religious and cultural morality of the
state. An overwhelming number of these cases involved targeting websites
and individuals who accessed or distributed anti-Islamic or pornographic
material (not including child pornography, which was captured in a sep-
arate category). An illustration of such an incident was from 2009, when
Pakistan blocked access to 450 sites including Facebook and YouTube after
an international event to depiction the prophet Mohammed was organized
on Facebook.
Cultural preservation, included incidents in which interventions were
attributed to the need to expel outside influence or threats to national inter-
ests were cited (but not related to terrorism or national security threats,
which were captured by a separate category). In December 2006, Iran shut
down access to websites such as YouTube and Amazon in order to “purge
the country of Western influence.” Though we encountered only a few cases
that cited preservation of racial harmony as the impetus for action, these
incidents are useful to recognize separately from other categories as they
focus intervention on protecting the public specifically from ethnic or racially
motivated violence. For example, in 2008 Germany convicted a blogger for
inciting hatred by denying the Holocaust.
Dissuading the public from criminal activity is another reason often
cited by officials. Incidents under this category include arresting individuals
for copyright infringement, distributing illegal information, and participating
in activities deemed illegal by the state, such as online gambling. Cases in
this subcategory included the arrests or criminal prosecutions of individuals
whom authorities claimed were breaking the law. An example of such a
case was when Polish authorities arrested the creators of a peer-to-peer
portal and shut down the site in 2009, citing copyright infringement as the
reasoning.
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Protecting children as a subcategory included incidents where officials
explicitly sited threats to children and minors as reasons for interven-
tion. While many of these incidents related to pornographic material, only
those cases that specifically included reference to child pornography were
included under this subcategory. States often adopted Internet laws and poli-
cies to protect children; an illustration includes Brazil’s adoption of policies
that require ISPs to provide lists of the websites they host to a child pro-
tection agency and put a button on their website that says “Pedophilia is a
crime, denounce it.”
Last, only four yet thematically distinct cases represented the final sub-
category under this theme: protecting individuals’ privacy. This subcategory
included incidences in which authorities determined that an individual’s pri-
vacy was jeopardized by content posted on the Internet. Perhaps the most
clear example of such a case was when Tunisian official jailed and fined
an individual for “causing harm by means of telecommunication networks”
because he did not obtain an official permit or consent of the individuals he
filmed for an online video.
There were certain types of cases that were difficult to categorize. There
include reports of some incidents where there was not enough information
to assert the reasons for the intervention. This includes cases in which offi-
cials simply did not cite a reason for intervention, or when our primary texts
did not provide enough insight into why the intervention took place. These
incidents categorized as unknown/other. In addition, there were cases in
which officials simply denied any responsibility for censorship or claimed it
was a technical issue, thus we are unable to attribute reasons for the inter-
vention. These cases are captured in the subcategories, censorship denied
and alleged system failure. While it may not be surprising that authoritarian
regimes invoke intervention policies to protect state authorities and institu-
tions, Table 2 reveals that democratic regimes exercise intervention efforts
at nearly the same level for these same reasons, which severely limits civil
society groups from participating in the foundational democratic practices of
the regime.
The advantage of a comparative approach is that it allows us to avoid
and move beyond organizational and technological determinism (Howard,
2002). It does so by allowing us to build grounded typologies of real
government responses to the development of new media, and particularly
social media.
The lasting effect of a temporary disconnection in Internet service
may actually be a strengthening of weak ties between global and local
civil society networks. When civil society disappears from the grid, it is
noticed. What lasts are the ties between a nation’s civic groups, and between
international nongovernmental organizations and like-minded, in-country
organizations. It is certain that not all of these virtual communities are
about elections, but their existence is a political phenomenon particularly
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TABLE 2 Why Do States Disconnect Their Digital Networks? Reasons, by Regime Type
(N = 556)
Emerging




30 7 23 1 61
Election crisis 4 3 9 0 16
Eliminating propaganda 5 1 24 0 30
Mitigating dissidence 8 5 11 3 27
National security 29 6 34 0 69
Preserving the public good
Preserving cultural and
religious morals
27 4 37 6 74
Preserving racial harmony 9 0 1 0 10
Protecting children 30 0 2 0 32
Cultural preservation 2 0 19 0 21
Protecting individual’s
privacy
3 0 2 0 5




4 4 9 0 17
Censorship denied by state 3 1 11 0 15
Unknown, other 40 4 90 4 138
Total 223 38 290 15 566
Note. Reasons for intervention are mutually exclusive.
in countries where state and social elites have worked hard to police offline
communities. Thus, even the bulletin boards and chat rooms dedicated to
shopping for brand name watches are sites that practice free speech and
where the defense of free speech can become a topic of conversation. The
Internet allows opposition movements that are based outside of a coun-
try to reach in and become part of the system of political communication
within even the strictest authoritarian regimes. Today, banning political par-
ties could simply mean that formal political opposition is now organized
online, from outside the country. It could also mean that civil society leaders
turn to other organizational forms permitted by network technologies. When
states disconnect particular social media services, student and civil soci-
ety leaders develop creative workarounds and relearn traditional (offline)
mobilization tactics. Thus, target sites, such as YouTube, Facebook, and
Twitter, are almost always accessible through other means.
CONCLUSION: THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF
DIGITAL INTERVENTIONS
When a political, military, or other security crisis is over, what remains is
the lasting effect of a temporary outage in digital network connectivity. The
230 P. N. Howard et al.
Internet has become a crucial component of political communications during
elections—even rigged ones. It has also become a crucial component of
political communication during other kinds of regime transition, such as
executive turnover, foreign military intervention, natural disasters, and social
protests that challenge a regime’s legitimacy. Information infrastructure is
not simply part of the general context of contemporary social mobilization.
Indeed, social computing is a defining feature of elections these days. Digital
media such as mobile phones and the Internet now help incubate civic
conversations, especially in countries that heavily censor the national print
and broadcast media.
Internet access is often limited to wealthy social elites, but these elites
have a key role in either accepting or rejecting the outcome of an election.
The Internet has become a necessary infrastructure for the development of
civil society and election season is often the time for civic groups to be
most active. Most (although not all) of the regimes studied in this event
catalogue are authoritarian, or were when the decision to disconnect from
global information networks was taken. For authoritarian regimes, the single
greatest threat to stability is often internal: elite defection. When the cohort
of wealthy families, educated and urban elites, and government employees
decide they no longer wish to back a regime, it is most likely to fail. In
most of the countries studied here, only a small fraction of the population
has Internet access through computers and mobile phones. However, this
small population is the one that authoritarian regimes work hard to broker
information for.
It is not Twitter, blogs, or YouTube that cause social unrest. Today,
successful social movement organizing and civic engagement is difficult
to imagine without them, even in countries such as Iran and Egypt.
Many people in these countries have no Internet or mobile phone access.
Nevertheless, the people who do—urban dwellers, educated elites, and the
young—are precisely the population with the capacity to enable regime
change, or tacitly support electoral outcomes. These are the populations
who support or defect from authoritarian rule, and for whom connections
to family and friends have demonstrably changed with technology diffu-
sion. Comparative analysis reveals the degree to which different regimes
feel threatened by social media, whether such tools are actively used to
organize dissent, or passively used for producing and consuming culture.
When digital networks are reactivated, personal networks that cross
international boundaries also reactivate. Digital outages have become
sensitive moments in which student leaders, journalists, and civil society
groups experiment with digital technologies. Even if their favorite candi-
dates are not elected, the process of experimentation with digital media is
important because it results in infusing more information habits and news
diets independent of the state into their daily engagement with public life.
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The political climax of uprising takes the form of state crackdowns or
major concession to popular demands that can include executive turnover.
Stalemates between protesters and ruling elites can result in protracted bat-
tles. However, in each country, the political climax of uprising can also
be marked by a clumsy attempt by the state to disconnect its own people
from digital communications networks. Banning access to social media web-
sites, powering down mobile phone towers, or disconnecting the Internet
exchange points in major cities are an authoritarian government’s desperate
strategies for asserting control. And there are serious economic conse-
quences to disconnecting a nation from global information infrastructures,
even temporarily. Interrupting digital services cost Egypt’s economy at least
$90 million, and their reputation among technology firms as a stable place
for investment. In Tunisia it was activist hackers—hacktivists as many call
themselves—who did the most economic damage by taking down the stock
exchange. For the most part, it is recalcitrant authoritarian governments who
make the decision to interfere with their country’s digital networks.
Most technology users in most countries do not have the sophistica-
tion to work around state firewalls or keep up anonymous and confidential
communications online. In each country, a handful of tech-savvy students
and civil society leaders have these skills, and used them well during the
Arab Spring. Learning from other democracy activists in other countries,
these information brokers used satellite phones, direct landline connections
to ISPs in Israel and Europe, and a suit of anonymization software tools to
supply the international media with pictures of events on the ground—even
when desperate dictators attempted to shut down national ISPs.
Information infrastructure is politics. And the political culture that we
now see online during elections comes not just from political elites, but
from citizens: using social media, documenting human rights abuses with
their mobile phones, sharing spreadsheets to track state expenditures, and
pooling information about official corruption. Perhaps the most lasting effect
of digital media use during crises is that people get accustomed to being able
to consume and produce political content. When regimes disconnect from
global information infrastructure, they employ a range of stop-gap measures
that usually reinforces public expectations for global connectivity.
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